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THE DOG DAYS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Kit Kinports* 
Last Halloween the highest court in the land literally went to the dogs, 
as the Supreme Court heard argument in cases involving two Florida 
narcotics-detection dogs, Aldo and Franky. In Florida v. Harris, Aldo 
finished best in show, with the Court holding for all practical purposes that 
a trained drug dog’s positive alert creates probable cause to search.1 The 
Court put Franky on a shorter leash, however, concluding in Florida v. 
Jardines that a dog conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment when it 
physically intrudes on a suspect’s property for the purpose of collecting 
evidence.2 
Both decisions had the effect of articulating bright-line rules, thereby 
deviating from precedent that favored a more amorphous standard 
considering all the surrounding circumstances. Totality-of-the-
circumstances inquiries can be messy and unpredictable, but if done fairly 
they can also lead to sensible outcomes. By contrast, purportedly clear rules 
tend to oversimplify, creating an inherent risk of overinclusion or 
underinclusion. The recent rulings in the drug-dog cases illustrate these 
dangers, as Harris exhibits overconfidence in the accuracy of drug-dog 
alerts while Jardines threatens to underprotect less privileged 
socioeconomic classes. 
I. ALDO AND PROBABLE CAUSE 
On two separate occasions, Clayton Harris had the misfortune of being 
pulled over by Officer William Wheetley for a minor traffic offense. Both 
times, the officer’s drug-detection dog, Aldo, alerted to the door handle on 
the driver’s side of Harris’s truck. Although the officer’s subsequent 
searches of the truck did not reveal any drugs the dog was trained to detect, 
the first uncovered materials used in manufacturing methamphetamine. 
Harris was arrested following that first search for possessing 
pseudoephedrine, a key ingredient of methamphetamine, and he later 
admitted that he regularly used and produced the narcotic. The Florida 
Supreme Court ruled that Aldo’s positive alert was insufficient to create 
probable cause to search the truck absent specific details about the dog’s 
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training regimen and performance in the field, including any alerts that had 
not led to the discovery of narcotics.3 
In an opinion written by Justice Kagan, a unanimous Supreme Court 
reversed the Florida court. The Supreme Court’s decision was not 
particularly surprising, given its ruling thirty years earlier in Illinois v. 
Gates redefining probable cause using a totality-of-the-circumstances 
approach.4 Describing the lower court’s opinion in Harris as creating “a 
strict evidentiary checklist,” the Supreme Court noted that its concept of 
probable cause, by contrast, “rejected rigid rules, bright-line tests, and 
mechanistic inquiries in favor of a more flexible, all-things-considered 
approach.”5 
More problematic was the Court’s sweeping rule that a drug dog’s 
positive alert is enough to create a presumption of probable cause so long as 
the dog either “recently and successfully completed a training program” or 
was certified by a “bona fide organization.”6 Rather than a totality-of-the-
circumstances approach, this statement resembles the bright-line rules the 
Court’s probable cause jurisprudence has recently avoided. 
Admittedly, the Court qualified its holding with the parenthetical 
“subject to any conflicting evidence,” and then went on to require that 
defendants be given an opportunity to contest a drug dog’s reliability either 
by cross-examining the dog’s handler or presenting their own witnesses.7 
This caveat is presumably what enabled the Court to claim its opinion 
called for an examination of “all the facts surrounding a dog’s alert,” just 
like “every inquiry into probable cause.”8 
For all practical purposes, however, an alert by a trained dog will now 
lead to a finding of probable cause because the defense is not likely to have 
access to information necessary to challenge a dog’s reliability. Details 
about training programs the dog and its handler completed are in the hands 
of the government, and a defendant who was not on the scene during the 
dog sniff cannot know whether the dog was cued by its handler or working 
under “unfamiliar conditions.”9 In addition, evidence concerning the dog’s 
performance in the field may not even be available. In Harris, for example, 
records were kept only of Aldo’s alerts that actually led to an arrest.10 Even 
where such information exists, some courts have denied defense requests 
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for discovery of a dog’s records,11 and in Harris, the Solicitor General took 
the position that such evidence should “typically” not be discoverable.12 
Even if field records are turned over to the defendant, the Court’s 
ruling in Harris suggested that this data is not entitled to much weight in 
probable cause determinations. Although at one point the Court’s opinion 
cryptically mentioned that field records “may sometimes be relevant,” it 
devoted a paragraph to defending the view that “in most cases” field 
performance has “relatively limited import.”13 In addition to providing little 
information about false negatives, the Court thought field data may 
“markedly overstate . . . real false positives” if a dog alerts where drugs are 
too well concealed or too small to be discovered.14 Though these 
hypotheticals seem somewhat unrealistic, the Court expressed a distinct 
preference for evidence of a dog’s performance in “controlled testing 
environments.”15 But a controlled classroom provides an imperfect sense of 
a dog’s accuracy as well. It may not have the same distractions or 
complications present in the field, and may generate skewed results absent 
double-blind testing where neither the handler nor the dog knows the 
location of the drugs.16 Moreover, the “practical and common-sensical”17 
nature of Gates’s totality-of-the-circumstances test suggests that the dog’s 
actual track record under similar circumstances ought to be considered for 
whatever light it can shed on the probable cause inquiry.18 Therefore, the 
largely meaningless opportunity Harris affords defendants to rebut the 
prosecution’s showing of probable cause does not diminish the bright-line 
nature of the Court’s ruling. 
Additionally, the Court offered no justification for creating a drug-dog 
exception to the Gates totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. Although the 
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Solicitor General’s amicus brief pleaded for a bright-line test to provide 
guidance to law enforcement, the Government did not distinguish drug-dog 
alerts from any other probable cause inquiry.19 Gates justified the decision 
to abandon the rigid two-pronged definition of probable cause the Court had 
previously applied to informants on the grounds that tips come in “many 
shapes and sizes,”20 and here too the reliability of drug-dog alerts varies. No 
national or uniform standards govern the programs used to train drug-
detection dogs.21 Moreover, the accuracy of an alert depends on the 
particular dog’s abilities as well as the conditions under which it is 
working.22 
In addition to deviating from thirty years of probable cause precedent, 
the opinion in Harris glossed over concerns about drug dogs’ reliability—
an issue that has surfaced in the literature and that was addressed by the 
court below, in the Supreme Court briefs, and at oral argument.23 Though 
the scientific understanding of drug-detection dogs is still developing,24 
research has shown that a significant percentage of positive alerts do not 
lead to the discovery of narcotics.25 In many cases, errors result from 
miscommunications between the handler and the dog—sometimes even 
from the handler’s subconscious cues, such as prolonging the dog’s 
exposure to places where the handler suspects narcotics are hidden.26 
Moreover, without some indication of the base rate of criminality—i.e., the 
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  See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae: The National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. at 6–9, 
Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (No. 11-817) (citing various studies showing success rates of 20%, 26%, and 
44%); Lisa Lit et al., Handler Beliefs Affect Scent Detection Dog Outcomes, 14 ANIMAL COGNITION 
387, 390 (2011) (finding that only one out of eighteen dogs did not falsely alert in a double-blind test). 
26
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27
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Furthermore, as the Court pointed out in Harris, a dog “recognizes an 
odor, not a drug.”28 As a result, a positive alert may occur when the dog 
detects the smell of either a chemical ingredient of narcotics that is present 
in legal products, or an innocuous item associated with drugs or the dog’s 
training.29 A dog’s detection of such items using its sense of smell should be 
treated no differently than a police officer’s visual observation of them, 
which is not necessarily sufficient in and of itself to give rise to probable 
cause.30 
The dog may also give a positive signal that yields no evidence of 
drugs where it detects residual odor. The Harris opinion did address this 
issue, denying that an alert to residual odor constitutes a false positive. 
Rather, the Court argued, a dog “should alert” to a scent “even if the 
substance is gone.”31 And the Court rejected as irrelevant what it called “the 
mere chance” that drugs might no longer be present, instead concluding 
without support or analysis that there is still “a fair probability” of 
discovering “either drugs or evidence of a drug crime (like the precursor 
chemicals in Harris’s truck).”32 
Of course, the residual-odor theory can be proffered—and cannot be 
refuted—for any unproductive search, and in fact was the Court’s “likely” 
explanation for Aldo’s two positive alerts to Harris’s vehicle.33 Even more 
important, probable cause to search requires an assessment of the odds that 
evidence is currently located in the place to be searched, not that it was 
there at some indeterminate time in the past.34 Officer Wheetley could not 
say for how long Aldo could still detect residual odor,35 and estimates of 
dogs’ capacity to smell residual odors vary depending on, among other 
things, the particular drug at issue.36 Admittedly, as the Court pointed out, a 
police officer who smells the distinctive odor of marijuana might likewise 
be detecting residual odor.37 But a dog, unlike an officer, cannot 
communicate the strength of a detected scent or its level of certainty that the 
odor is actually present.38 Paradoxically, then, a dog’s much more sensitive 
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nose is a less reliable indicator that drugs are still on the scene than the 
human sense of smell. 
A defensible argument can be made both for defining probable cause 
by a totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry and for creating bright-line rules, 
or at least “presumptive rules for . . . recurring . . . issues.”39 Although the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is notoriously inconsistent on the 
subject of bright lines,40 at the very least it should be able to stick to one 
approach on any given Fourth Amendment issue. Moreover, fairness 
demands a two-way street, and the Court should not reject only bright-line 
rules that make it harder to prove probable cause while endorsing ones that 
facilitate the prosecution’s case. Harris’s overconfidence in the accuracy of 
drug dogs and its disregard for the distinct possibility of error further 
suggest that the Court acted prematurely by creating a drug-dog exception 
to the totality-of-the-circumstances test. Just like many fixed rules create 
problems of overinclusion or underinclusion,41 the one that effectively 
emerges from the decision in Harris is overinclusive and threatens to close 
off debate concerning an investigative tool whose reliability depends on a 
technical understanding that is still evolving. 
II. FRANKY AND FOURTH AMENDMENT “SEARCHES” 
After receiving an uncorroborated tip that Joelis Jardines was growing 
marijuana in his house, a detective and his narcotics-detection dog, Franky, 
walked up the driveway to Jardines’s front porch. When the dog alerted 
positively at the base of the front door, a search warrant for the home was 
issued and a number of marijuana plants were seized. In a five-to-four 
decision written by Justice Scalia, the Court determined that the police had 
conducted a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.42 
The majority relied on last year’s decision in United States v. Jones, in 
which the Court held that law enforcement officials effected a Fourth 
Amendment search when they installed a GPS device on a suspect’s car and 
tracked the car’s movements for four weeks.43 In an opinion also authored 
by Justice Scalia, the Jones majority made the surprising announcement that 
the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy definition of a search44 that the 
Court had consistently applied for forty-five years merely “added to,” but 
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108:64 (2013) The Dog Days of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
 70 
did not “substitute[] for, the common-law trespassory test.”45 Reasoning that 
the Fourth Amendment should at least protect the same “‘degree of 
privacy’” recognized at the time of the framing, the Jones majority relied on 
common-law notions of trespass to find that government officials conduct a 
search when they “obtain[] information by physically intruding on a 
constitutionally protected area.”46 Accordingly, Justice Scalia, a persistent 
critic of Katz,47 saw no need to analyze GPS tracking under the reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test.48 
Following in Jones’s footsteps—though without ever using the word 
trespass49—the majority in Jardines held that the police committed an 
“unlicensed physical intrusion” on “a constitutionally protected area” by 
“gathering information” in the curtilage of Jardines’s home.50 The Court 
acknowledged that not every entry onto private property constitutes a search 
given that permission to enter “may be implied from the habits of the 
country.”51 Therefore, the Court explained, police may “approach a home 
and knock,” just like any solicitor, delivery person, or other member of the 
public, but “the background social norms that invite a visitor to the front 
door do not invite him there to conduct a search.”52 
Even though Justice Scalia’s opinion again declined to apply the 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test,53 three of the five Justices in the 
majority joined a separate opinion written by Justice Kagan, which 
described Jardines as an “‘easy cas[e] . . .’ twice over” because the dog also 
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Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 24) (arguing that “Jones purports to restore a trespass test that never previously existed”), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2154611. 
47
  See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the 
Katz definition as “fuzzy,” “self-indulgent,” and “notoriously unhelpful”). 
48
  See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950. Five members of the Court did, however, apply the reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy analysis. Four Justices, in an opinion written by Justice Alito, were critical of the 
majority’s novel trespass approach, but agreed that “lengthy monitoring” by means of a GPS device in 
the course of investigating “most offenses” constitutes a search under Katz. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., 
concurring in the judgment). Justice Sotomayor also wrote a separate opinion, agreeing with both the 
majority and the Alito concurrence, and suggesting she might be prepared to find that “unique attributes 
of GPS surveillance” make “even short-term monitoring” a search under Katz. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
49
  For the suggestion that the Court did so to avoid reversing the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling 
that no trespass occurred under state tort law, see Bradley Pollina, Florida v. Jardines: Why the Supreme 
Court Did Not Say “Trespass,” 3 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 19, 21 (2013), 
http://wakeforestlawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/PollinaArticle1.pdf. 
50
  Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414, 1415 (2013). 
51
  Id. at 1415 (quoting McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922)). 
52
  Id. at 1416. 
53
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effected a search under Katz.54 The police violated Jardines’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy, the concurrence concluded, because Franky 
“reveal[ed] within the confines of a home what they could not otherwise 
have found there.”55 
The four dissenters, in an opinion written by Justice Alito, disagreed on 
both counts. On the Jones test, the dissent argued that under an implied 
license by custom, trespass law allows even “unwelcome visitors”—
including the police and their dogs—“to use a walkway to approach the 
front door of a house and to remain there for a brief time.”56 On the Katz 
question, the dissenting opinion thought there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in “odors emanating from a house [that] may be 
detected from locations that are open to the public.”57 
Although adherents of the Jones test defend it as a way of avoiding the 
“thorny” and “‘vexing’” issues created by Katz,58 the elements of the 
Jardines definition each create line-drawing issues of their own. On the 
most mundane level, the Court might be right that Jardines’s front porch is 
the “classic exemplar” of the curtilage of a home.59 But it was on less solid 
ground when it claimed that the curtilage is “generally ‘clearly marked’” 
and “‘easily understood.’”60 In fact, the Solicitor General’s office argued 
that Jardines’s front porch and walkway “may be considered outside the 
curtilage.”61 And even the Court admitted that the multi-factor definition of 
“curtilage” articulated in United States v. Dunn was not a “finely tuned 
formula” that can be “mechanically applied” to “yield[] a ‘correct’ answer 
to all extent-of-curtilage questions.”62 The Court proved quite prescient on 
that point, as the Dunn factors have spawned a tremendous amount of 
litigation.63 
Second, an implied license by custom can vary depending on the 
norms of a particular location,64 contrary to the Court’s traditional insistence 
that the contours of the Fourth Amendment do not “vary from place to place 
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  Id. at 1420 (Kagan, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 1417 (majority opinion)). 
55
  Id. at 1419. 
56
  Id. at 1420, 1422 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
57
  Id. at 1421. 
58
  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012) (quoting id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment)); see also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1407, 1417 (2013) (claiming that the “property-rights 
baseline . . . keeps easy cases easy”). 
59
  Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415. 
60
  Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 n.12 (1984)). 
61
  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 24 n.8, Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 
1409 (No. 11-564). 
62
  480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (listing four factors to be considered in defining curtilage: how far the 
area in question was from the home, whether it was “within an enclosure surrounding the home,” how it 
was used, and what precautions were taken to “protect [it] from observation by people passing by”). 
63
  See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 2.4(a), at 811–16. 
64
  See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 220 (2000). 
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and from time to time.”65 Moreover, permission to enter property is subject 
to the complete discretion of the property owner, and individuals can 
therefore opt out of the traditional customs.66 Thus, the implied invitation to 
“the Nation’s Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters”—and to the police67—
presumably can be revoked by a locked front gate, or a sign that says “No 
Solicitors,” “No Dogs,” or even “No Police.”68 As a result, Jardines puts 
police officers and courts in the unenviable position of trying to “guess . . . 
whether landowners . . . erected fences sufficiently high [or] posted a 
sufficient number of warning signs.”69 
The final element of the Jardines test turns on a police officer’s 
subjective motivation for entering the property. In an effort to remain 
faithful to its two-year-old decision in Kentucky v. King, the Jardines 
majority acknowledged that police do not conduct a search by approaching 
a home and knocking “in order to speak with the occupant, because all are 
invited to do that.”70 The seeds of this intent inquiry can be found in Jones, 
where the Court observed that a trespass alone does not qualify as a Fourth 
Amendment search unless it involves “an attempt to find something or to 
obtain information.”71 Yet Jones’s casual references to law enforcement 
objectives did not attract much attention, perhaps because it was hard to 
imagine any other plausible explanation for attaching a GPS device to 
Jones’s vehicle. Therefore, Justice Breyer can hardly be faulted for 
expressing surprise during oral argument in Jardines when Justice Scalia 
suggested that law enforcement intent is relevant to the Jones analysis.72 
The likely source of Justice Breyer’s confusion is, as Justice Scalia 
himself noted in his 2011 majority opinion in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, the 
Court’s “almost uniform[] reject[ion of] invitations to probe subjective 
intent” in Fourth Amendment cases because the Amendment “regulates 
 
65
  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996). 
66
  See DOBBS, supra note 64, § 96, at 220 (noting that homeowners “have an opportunity, at low 
cost, to express [their] dissent from the custom,” for example, by “post[ing] a sign forbidding 
salespeople to enter”). 
67
  Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415–16 (2013). 
68
  See Brief for the United States, supra note 61, at 24 (admitting that “[t]he analysis may be 
different if . . . the occupant took steps to bar all visitors”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Jardines, 
133 S. Ct. 1409 (No. 11-564) (arguing on behalf of the State that “police officers can walk up the front 
path, absent a sign or something”). 
69
  Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984). 
70
  Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416 n.4 (emphasis omitted). 
71
  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 n.5 (2012); see also id. at 949 (concluding that the 
“installation . . . and . . . use of [a GPS] to monitor” a suspect’s movements qualifies as a search 
(emphasis added)). 
72
  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 68, at 44 (Justice Scalia chiding Jardines’s attorney 
for being “wrong not to accept” the relevance of police intent because “our cases support it”); id. at 51 
(Justice Breyer noting that the Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions focus on police “behavior” rather 
than “subjective motive,” and then commenting, “I don’t know what in Jones changed that”). 
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conduct rather than thoughts.”73 According to Justice Scalia, the one 
“unusual” and “narrow” exception to this practice comes in the 
administrative inspection and special needs cases, which recognize an 
exception to the warrant requirement only for searches conducted for a 
proper regulatory purpose.74 Thus, the Court previously considered 
subjective intent “irrelevant” in defining a Fourth Amendment search under 
Katz, on the grounds that the key is “the objective effect of [the officers’] 
actions,” not that they may have been “‘motivated by a law enforcement 
purpose.’”75 
In explaining why a police officer’s motive is nonetheless an element 
of Jardines’s definition of a search, Justice Scalia reasoned that law 
enforcement intent is only irrelevant in Fourth Amendment cases involving 
searches that are “objectively reasonable.” In contrast, Jardines turned on 
“whether the officer’s conduct was an objectively reasonable search.”76 But 
this is the first time the Court has considered an officer’s purpose when 
analyzing the “search” half of that equation, as opposed to the “objectively 
reasonable” inquiry at issue in the administrative inspection cases. 
This final element of the Jardines definition is not only illustrative of 
the fluctuation between objective and subjective standards running through 
the Court’s Fourth Amendment rulings,77 but is also likely to pose difficult 
line-drawing questions for the courts. Does any use of a drug dog on the 
curtilage constitute a search, in light of the Jardines majority’s observation 
that “a stranger” is not expected “to explore the curtilage of the home with 
trained drug dogs”?78 Or would the case have come out the other way if the 
officers had also knocked on the door while Franky was sniffing around, 
given other language in the opinion suggesting that police exceed the scope 
of their implied invitation only if they “enter . . . in order to do nothing but 
conduct a search”?79 If so, is the sequencing of the knock and dog sniff 
important? Or does even a preliminary knock exceed the scope of the 
implied license because the Court focused elsewhere on the 
inappropriateness of a visitor conducting a search “before saying hello and 
asking permission”?80 On the facts before it in Jardines, the Court thought 
 
73
  131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080, 2081 (2011). 
74
  Id. at 2083. For a critique of the Court’s failure to analyze al-Kidd under the administrative 
inspection rubric, see Kit Kinports, Camreta and al-Kidd: The Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment, 
and Witnesses, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283 (2012). 
75
  Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 n.2 (2000) (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 
212 (1986)). 
76
  Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416–17 (2013). 
77
  See Kinports, supra note 40, at 77–88. 
78
  Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415 n.2. 
79
  Id. at 1416 n.4 (emphasis added). 
80
  Id. at 1416 (emphasis added). Note that a second officer did knock on Jardines’s door after 
Franky had alerted and left the scene. See Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 37 n.1 (Fla. 2011), aff’d, 133 
S. Ct. 1409. 
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the officers’ “behavior objectively reveal[ed] a purpose to conduct a 
search.”81 But in other cases, law enforcement conduct will be more 
equivocal—especially if police are trained to steer clear of Jardines—and 
courts will be forced to conduct a subjective inquiry into the officers’ state 
of mind. 
Even if lower courts prove capable of administering the Supreme 
Court’s new test and discerning law enforcement’s motivations, the 
majority did not explain why homeowners impliedly invite police onto their 
property to conduct investigations that involve questioning but not 
searching. In Kentucky v. King, for example, police had witnessed an 
apparent drug deal outside an apartment building, and they were knocking 
on the door of the apartment they thought the suspect had entered.82 The 
officers in King were certainly trying to “find something” or “obtain 
information” as required by Jones.83 But the Jardines opinion at some 
points (though not others) subtly tweaked that language to focus on the 
narrower law enforcement purpose of “conduct[ing] a search.”84 That 
modification of Jones adds an element of circularity to the definition of a 
search. Furthermore, if “[t]he scope of a license” can be restricted to “a 
specific purpose,”85 it seems unreasonable to assume a homeowner would 
impliedly invite the police onto her property to use any investigative 
technique designed to generate evidence of her guilt—or to approach the 
front door for any reason other than to solicit donations for a police 
association charity, respond to a call for help, or look for witnesses or 
assistance solving a crime committed by someone else.86 
The inconsistencies and confusion generated by the majority’s 
approach are not the most troubling aspects of Jardines. The Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence has traditionally—and appropriately—accorded 
the same level of protection to every “castle,” no matter how grand or 
humble.87 Yet the focus on property rights threatens to privilege those of 
higher socioeconomic status.88 The Court considered the front porch of 
 
81
  Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417. 
82
  See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1854 (2011). 
83
  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 n.5 (2012). 
84
  Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417. But cf. id. at 1414, 1417 (elsewhere using terms more in line with 
Jones—“obtain[ing]” and “gathering information” and “gather[ing] evidence”). 
85
  Id. at 1416. 
86
  Cf. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423 (2004) (distinguishing checkpoints whose “purpose was 
not to determine whether a vehicle’s occupants were committing a crime, but to ask vehicle occupants, 
as members of the public, for their help in providing information about a crime in all likelihood 
committed by others”). 
87
  See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982) (explaining that “the central purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment forecloses such a distinction”). 
88
  Cf. David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 MISS. L.J. 143, 
185 (2002) (pointing out that the amount of privacy the common law accorded in the eighteenth century 
“depended strongly on who [you] were”). 
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Jardines’s single-family residence part of the protected curtilage of a home, 
but it is difficult to see what “constitutionally protected area” would have 
been invaded if Franky had alerted from the public walkway outside a row 
house or trailer home or from the hallway of an apartment building or 
residential hotel that could be accessed by anyone. Likewise, Jardines 
presumably means that police conduct a search when they enter the 
curtilage to search the garbage of those who pay a premium to have it 
collected from the backyard, but not necessarily when the garbage is found 
on the curb.89 
The Katz approach endorsed by the three concurring Justices does not 
share the same defect of underinclusiveness because it does not turn on 
where a drug dog happens to be standing. It does, however, create problems 
of its own. The reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis is hardly a 
model of clarity either,90 though it offers an alternative to a physical-
intrusion test that is no less outdated today than it was when Katz was 
decided.91 
Nevertheless, Justice Kagan’s conclusion in Jardines—that the dog 
sniff violated the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy—is difficult 
to reconcile with the Court’s precedents. The concurring opinion claimed 
that the thermal imaging decision in Kyllo v. United States “already 
resolved” the case by holding that police effect a search when they “‘use[] a 
device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that 
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion.’”92 
Several years after Kyllo, however, Illinois v. Caballes distinguished 
thermal imagers from narcotics-detection dogs in refusing to find that a 
dog’s positive alert to a car during a lawful traffic stop constituted a 
search.93 Justice Kagan’s concurrence in Jardines in turn attempted to 
distinguish Caballes on the grounds that the Court has routinely found a 
lower expectation of privacy in cars than in homes.94 But, as reflected in the 
precedents Justice Kagan cited, the Court has used that rationale to create 
exceptions to the warrant requirement and has never denied that car 
 
89
  Cf. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–40 (1988) (finding no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in garbage left on the curb for collection). 
90
  See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503 
(2007) (arguing that the Court has used four different models in the Katz line of cases). 
91
  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that the 
physical-intrusion test “is, in the present day, bad physics as well as bad law”). 
92
  Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1419 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001)). 
93
  543 U.S. 405, 408–10 (2005). Presumably, that case would come out differently today under the 
Jones test if the dog stuck its nose through an open car window. 
94
  See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1419 n.1 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
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interiors carry a sufficient expectation of privacy to meet the Katz test at 
issue in Jardines.95 
Moreover, the distinction between homes and vehicles was not the 
salient factor for the Caballes majority. Rather, the Caballes Court claimed 
that its conclusion was “entirely consistent” with Kyllo because the critical 
fact in Kyllo was the thermal imager’s ability to “detect[] lawful activity,” 
whereas a drug dog that “only reveals the possession of contraband 
‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest.’”96 For this point, Caballes 
relied on dicta in United States v. Place, where the Court described a dog 
sniff as a sui generis investigative tool that does not effect a search because 
it “discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics” and therefore “does 
not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from 
public view.”97 Jardines may have been at the intersection of 
Place/Caballes and Kyllo, but it was clearly an overstatement to say the 
issue had already been decided.    
This point was not lost on the Jardines dissenters, who observed that 
the Kagan concurrence made “a very similar, if not identical argument” to 
one that was raised by Justice Souter’s dissent in Caballes and obviously 
failed to persuade a majority of that Court.98 But Justice Alito’s dissenting 
opinion in Jardines did not elaborate further, and therefore did not 
expressly endorse either Place’s characterization of dogs as sui generis or 
the notion that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband. 
Rather, the dissent relied primarily on a “plain view” rationale, that one 
lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in anything police agents, 
including dogs, can detect with their own senses.99 But given that the canine 
nose is so much more sensitive than its human counterpart—and that here it 
was trained on a home—this argument required the dissent to deal with 
Kyllo. Justice Alito made an unpersuasive effort to dismiss Kyllo as “a 
decision about the use of new technology” and the dangers of “‘advancing 
technology.’”100 Dogs, the dissent argued, are neither new nor a form of 
technology. But, again, that was not the Caballes Court’s understanding of 
Kyllo. Caballes distinguished dogs from thermal imagers because they do 
not reveal any lawful activity, not because they are more analogous to 
 
95
  See, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114–15 (1986) (concluding that intrusion into a car’s 
interior constituted a search); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591–92 & n.8 (1974) (plurality opinion) 
(noting that only the exterior of the car was inspected there). 
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  Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408–09 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)) 
(emphasis omitted). 
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  462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (finding that the dog sniff of a suitcase in an airport did not qualify as a 
search). 
98
  Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1424 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
99
  Id. For a possible explanation why the dissent ignored Place, see infra note 110 and 
accompanying text. 
100
  Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1425 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 
35 (2001)). 
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human noses than technological devices. Moreover, a dog may fall 
somewhere along the continuum between a person and a mechanical 
instrument, but relying on the plain view doctrine to compare a police 
officer’s sense of smell with something that is between 10,000 and 100,000 
times more sensitive101 is “unsound.”102 Thus, the dissent was no more 
successful than the concurrence in trying to reconcile its position with both 
Kyllo and the Place line of cases.   
The Jardines majority, of course, avoided that difficult task by skirting 
the Katz analysis altogether. Rather, Justice Scalia purported to adopt a 
bright-line rule—that a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected 
area to perform a search constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. But like 
many attempts to forge a clear rule, the Court’s test turns out to be fuzzier 
than it first appears and is underinclusive by affording less protection to 
certain types of residences. 
The Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis may be 
amorphous and subject to varying interpretations, but it is a commonsense 
standard just like Gates’s totality-of-the-circumstances concept of probable 
cause. The problem is not necessarily the Katz test itself, but the Court’s 
application of it in ways that defy reasonable expectations,103 such as the 
refusal to find a reasonable expectation of privacy whenever a suspect is in 
public or turns information over to a third party.104 Like other inquiries that 
consider all the surrounding circumstances, Katz could lead to sensible 
results and avoid the underinclusion problem plaguing Jardines if the Court 
were to truly analyze what reasonable people expect.105 
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALDO AND FRANKY 
Although the rulings in Harris and Jardines are each subject to 
criticism in their own right, so too is the relationship between the two 
decisions. It was presumably no coincidence that both cases were argued on 
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The majority’s property-based ruling in Jardines incentivizes police to 
keep their dogs off private property, thereby diminishing the dogs’ 
reliability. A dog’s accuracy depends on its proximity to the target, and 
there is little scientific data measuring how reliably a dog can detect 
narcotics even from outside a home106 much less from beyond the curtilage. 
As Jardines moves dogs farther away from a suspect’s property, the 
probability of error increases and Harris’s confidence that a positive alert 
gives rise to probable cause becomes even more questionable. 
As discussed above, none of the opinions in Jardines reiterated the 
argument initially made in Place—that dog sniffs are binary searches that 
disclose only the presence or absence of contraband. In fact, Jardines’s only 
mention of Place came in Justice Scalia’s opinion, which cited the case for 
the proposition that the State had “support in our case law” for a Katz 
argument the majority then declined to reach.107 But both the Kagan 
concurrence and the Alito dissent did discuss Caballes, with the concurring 
Justices distinguishing it and the dissenters relying on it. None of the 
Justices seemed willing to repudiate Caballes’s holding that the dog sniff of 
a properly stopped vehicle is not a search, even though both opinions 
ignored the decision’s central rationale. Caballes did not turn on the lesser 
expectation of privacy in vehicles or on the analogy to the human sense of 
smell. Rather, Caballes was fundamentally derived from Place. 
To be sure, there is good reason to push Place off center stage. First, 
Place’s sui generis argument is of questionable pedigree—whether a dog 
sniff effects a Fourth Amendment search was not briefed or argued in either 
the Supreme Court or the court below, and yet the Court resolved it in two 
paragraphs of dicta unsullied by a single supporting citation.108 
Nevertheless, the dicta took on a life of its own, with the Court repeating it 
in later opinions—and ultimately Caballes—that relied on Place (and then 
each other) for support.109 On a more substantive level, the definition of a 
search should not turn on what the police uncover, for the Fourth 
Amendment is designed to protect the guilty as well as the innocent. As 
Justice Kennedy observed several times during the oral argument in 
Jardines, the no-reasonable-expectation-of-privacy-in-contraband mantra is 
“circular” reasoning.110 (Ironically, he then chose to join the opinion that 
strayed the least from Place and Caballes, Justice Alito’s dissent.) Finally, 
as an empirical matter, scientific understanding of drug-detection dogs has 
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advanced in the thirty years since Place was decided such that the sui 
generis label no longer seems accurate. Justice Souter forcefully made this 
point in his lone dissent in Caballes, observing that “[t]he infallible dog . . . 
is a creature of legal fiction.”111 While his argument fell on deaf ears, the 
current Court’s apparent inclination to snub Place and refashion Caballes 
may signal a welcome willingness to rethink the wisdom of the Place dicta. 
But that puts Jardines on a collision course with Harris. If a dog sniff 
is not viewed as a sui generis investigative tool that discloses only the 
presence of contraband, it becomes harder to defend Harris’s conclusion 
that an alert from a trained dog generally gives rise to probable cause. 
Contrary to the sentiments expressed in the popular song, then, the dog 
days are far from over,112 and Harris and Jardines have not yet put the 
Fourth Amendment issues surrounding drug-detection dogs to bed. Not 
only is there an inherent tension between the two opinions, but they both 
generate rigid rules in place of the more commonsense totality-of-the-
circumstances standards favored in the Court’s precedents. By deliberately 
sidestepping the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis in 
Jardines, and effectively ignoring the Gates totality-of-the-circumstances 
concept of probable cause in Harris, both opinions essentially draw bright 
lines that, like many rules, lack precision and thus suffer from 
underinclusiveness or overinclusiveness. 
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